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Abstract
Recent developments in philosophy, linguistics, devel-
opmental psychology and articial intelligence make it
possible to envision a developmental path for an ar-
ticial agent, grounded in activity-based sensorimotor
representations. This paper describes how Neo, an ar-
ticial agent, learns concepts by interacting with its
simulated environment. Relatively little prior struc-
ture is required to learn fairly accurate representations
of objects, activities, locations and other aspects of
Neo's experience. We show how classes (categories) can
be abstracted from these representations, and discuss
how our representation might be extended to express
physical schemas, general, domain-independent activi-
ties that could be the building blocks of concept forma-
tion.
Introduction
Our goal is to build a baby, or rather, an articial agent
who lives in a simulated environment and who even-
tually learns to think like a three year old. A virtual
infant, if you like. The abilities we want our agent,
which we call Neo, to develop include learning, planning,
language, an organized memory containing structured
knowledge, and attention. Central to these abilities is a
conceptual structure, an ontology, a way to \carve the
world at its joints." Given a conceptual structure, we
can see a developmentalpath to more advanced thought,
including emotion and consciousness. As Neo develops,
we expect to learn much about the nature of accessi-
ble representations, the functions of categories, and the
representation and roles of goals. We will elucidate the
relationship between activity, attention, memory and
learning. We hope to demonstrate that an agent can
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develop sophisticated knowledge from minimal begin-
nings. The goal of this paper is more modest, however:
to show that Neo can acquire concepts and categories
from interacting with its environment.
Categorization, as Lako points out, is central to hu-
man thought (Lako 1984). It is also central to Lako
and Johnson's challenge to Objectivism (Johnson 1987;
Lako & Johnson 1980; Lako 1984), the dominant view
in Western philosophy that there is an objective way
to represent the world and reason about it. Inuenced
by Eleanor Rosch's research on categorization, Lako
and Johnson argue that categories are based less on
objective features such as color, size, and shape, than
on interactional properties and relationships, such as
\graspable" and \ts-in-my-mouth," which character-
ize how an agent interacts with its environment. At the
same time, AI researchers such as Agre (Agre 1988),
Chapman (Chapman 1991), and Ballard (Ballard 1989)
have argued for deictic or agent-centered representa-
tions. Lako and Johnson make a convincing case that
adult conceptual structures are grounded in primitive
interactional knowledge that could very well be acquired
by infants. Thus, in contrast with Piaget's theory of
developmental stages (Ginsberg & Opper 1988), we can
now envision a continuous developmental trajectory|
for conceptual knowledge, at least|beginningwith sim-
ple, interactional primitives in infancy (relationships
among actions and objects in the physical world, for ex-
ample) and becoming more elaborate through abstrac-
tion and metaphorical extension as the agent develops
(Lako & Johnson 1980). Indeed, Mandler's work, to
which we owe much, outlines such a developmental tra-
jectory and the empirical evidence for it (Mandler 1988;
1992). One contribution of the current paper is to show
that a simulated infant can learn concepts in roughly
the way Mandler suggests real infants learn.
There is a strong temptation to see in the infancy
literature evidence of nativism, the idea that infants
are born with conceptual structures. Obviously, babies'
minds have some structure at birth, but we are anti-
nativist, minimalist in our approach. We do not agree
that babies must be born with theories of the physical
world (Carey & Gelman 1991), and in fact we show that
Neo can learn concepts given very little prior structure.
Baby World
Neo is a virtual agent who lives in a simulated environ-
ment. Babyworld implements Neo's sensations, mental
representations, mental and physical activities, and the
behavior of objects and other agents that interact with
Neo. Babyworld has two parts: one, which we call Neo,
implements everything that Neo does, including learn-
ing, moving, looking, crying, and so on. The other part,
called StreamsWorld, represents Neo's internal and ex-
ternal environment, and it implements events that hap-
pen in and around Neo and in response to Neo's actions.
Notably, StreamsWorld represents Neo's sensations of
its external environment and also internal states such
as hunger. No distinction is made between \inside" and
\outside"; Neo must learn it.
Neo senses its environment through a collection of
streams, which are divided into discrete time steps. On
each time step t, a stream 
i
holds a token  , that is,

i;t
=  . Tokens represent sensations or processed per-
cepts. For example, one token is \rattle-shape," and it
is placed in the appropriate stream whenever Neo's eyes
point at an object that is shaped like a rattle; that is,

sight shape;t
=rattle-shape. (We will discuss the bias
this tactic engenders in a later section.) The streams
that represent Neo's internal sensations include an af-
fect stream that contains tokens such as happy and sad,
a pain stream, a hunger stream, and somatic and haptic
streams that are active when Neo moves and grasps.
The Babyworld simulator is simple and probabilistic.
For example, Neo gets hungry some time after eating,
it cries when it is unhappy or in pain; when Neo cries,
Mommy usually visits, unless she is angry at Neo for
crying, in which case she stays away. Neo falls asleep
intermittently; it can move its arm and head, and grasp
several objects, including three rattles, a bottle, a mo-
bile, a bunch of metallic keys, and a knife. The latter
causes pain. The rattles make noise when shaken.
Currently, Neo is incapable of anything we would call
volition. If Neo's eyes alight on a rattle then Neo will
grasp the rattle with some probability. However goal-
directed this might appear, Neo's mind contains nothing
that could be interpreted as a goal.
How Neo Learns
What does Neo's mind contain, then? Fluents, mostly.
Fluents represent things that don't change, or that
change in highly regular, predictable ways. Fluents are
a step away from the state-based representations of AI
planning research, such as situation calculus, toward
script-like representations. Fluents explicitly represent
events that have duration; in fact Neo learns the mean
and variance of the duration of each uent. The sound
made by a rattle is a uent, so is the sensation of hold-
ing the rattle, and so are the visual sensations of the
shape and color of the rattle. Of course, the concept
\rattle" has all these components, so somehow, uents
for the color, shape, sound and texture of a rattle must
be linked up in a single uent. Neo accomplishes this,
building larger uents from smaller ones, with two sim-
ple learning rules that count cooccurrences. First, if
Neo notices that two uents often start and stop simul-
taneously, it infers that the uents are parts of a larger
one. This rule learns uents that represent objects and
states. Second, if Neo notices that one uent often fol-
lows another, it infers that both are parts of a larger
uent that represents an activity. The word \often" in
these rules hides a statistical inference that uents cooc-
cur more frequently than one would expect by chance if
they were independent.
The important features of uents as representations
are that they represent states or processes with tem-
poral extent (even objects are represented as things
that exist over time), they are composable, and they
are learned by counting cooccurrences. Although the
simplest uents represent sensations, it's important to
recognize that uents are not identical with sensations.
Sensations are tokens in streams; uents are representa-
tions stored in memory. Streams are the locus of Neo's
sensory experience, uents are the locus of Neo's knowl-
edge. And although Neo's earliest uents are just copies
of its sensations, they soon become aggregated and ab-
stracted.
All the examples in this paper are from a single \run"
of Neo, lasting 30,000 time steps. (A time step corre-
sponds to one second of real time. The run we describe
here thus corresponds to roughly eight hours of Neo's
life.) Fluents are learned gradually: It might take hun-
dreds or thousands of time steps to nd enough cooc-
currences to create a uent, and composite uents are
obviously learned after their components.
Having said Neo combines small uents into larger
ones, we should say where the small uents come from.
One approach is to say the smallest uents are token
values that persist in streams. For example, red and
rattle-shape are each persistent tokens because Neo
tends to look at objects for several time steps before
shifting its gaze; if Neo is currently seeing something
red, then it will probably see something red on the next
time step. Our rst implementation of Neo had individ-
ual, persistent tokens as the smallest uents, but there
were too many ways to combine these uents, and most
produced larger uents that didn't correspond to any-
thing in Neo's environment. We decided that the small-
est uents should be larger than individual tokens. And
if the smallest uents contained, say, two tokens, from
dierent streams, then we could use the covariance of
streams to focus Neo's attention on pairs of tokens that
\go together," as we will now describe.
Scopes
The rst things Neo learns are not uents, but rather,
pairs of streams in which to look for uents. These pairs
are called scopes. A stream 
i
is said to change state at
time t, denoted (i; t), when 
i;t 1
6= 
i;t
; that is, 
i
changes state at time t when it contains a dierent token
at time t than it did at time t   1. Conversely, (i; t)
means the stream doesn't change state: 
i;t 1
= 
i;t
.
Neo learns a scope, s
ij
, when streams 
i
and 
j
change
together often. Said dierently, Neo learns s
ij
when the
joint event (i; t) & (j; t) occurs frequently relative to
the joint events (i; t) & (j; t) and (i; t) & (j; t).
To assess the relative frequencies of these events, Neo
uses contingency tables like this one:
(sight-color,t)
(sight-color,t)
total
(sight-shape,t) 2996 945 3941
(sight-shape,t)
826 25232 26058
total 3822 26177 29999
This says that the streams sight-shape and sight-
color changed state simultaneously 2996 times, and
one changed when the other didn't 945 + 826 = 1771
times. To assess the strength of association between
sight-shape and sight-color we square the frequency
in the rst cell of the contingency table (2996) and di-
vide by the product of the rst row and rst column
margins (3941 and 3822, respectively). The maximum
value for this statistic is 1.0, and for the table above it
is 2996
2
=(3941 3822) = :596.
1
Neo maintains contingency tables for all pairs of
streams.
2
When the measure of association for a ta-
ble exceeds a threshold, a scope is created. Table 1
shows the top ten scopes learned by Neo in a run of
30,000 timesteps (i.e., the scopes with the highest mea-
sures of association), and also the ten worst scopes. No-
tice that the sight-shape and sight-color streams are
more highly associated than any except do-sleep and
sleep. Other high-ranking scopes are (sound voice),
1
Neo could use other statistics, such as 
2
and G, pro-
vided the contingency table is scaled to a constant total,
preserving the proportions. (Scaling is necessary because 
2
and G are not independent of sample size.) In practice, Neo
learns the same scopes, and ranks them similarly, irrespec-
tive of how it measures association in its contingency tables.
2
While this may seem like a lot of bookkeeping, especially
as the number of streams grows, bear in mind that maintain-
ing a contingency table is a very simple operation. All the
contingency table updates could be done in unit time on a
parallel machine. At higher levels of processing, operations
may become more complex and require non-local data. In
that case, we view it as the purpose of the attentional mech-
anism to keep processing per unit time down to reasonable
level. Deciding what particular events in the environment
require attention, i.e. merit being assigned computational
resources, is a future direction of our research.
whichmakes sense because changes in the sound stream
are often produced by changes in the voice stream;
and (tactile-mouth mouth), which captures the fact
that when Neo starts to mouth (i.e., chew on) an ob-
ject, it gets tactile sensations in its mouth. The worst
scopes represent pairs of streams that are not associ-
ated. For example, there is no association between
sleeping and eating, and none between moving the arm
(do-arm) and hunger. Note that many scopes include
do-x streams; for example, (do-voice voice). These
are the components of Neo's actions: the do-voice part
represents the sensation of attempting to use the voice,
and the voice part represents the sensory feedback from
actually using the voice. Sometimes, Neo will experi-
ence do-voice but not voice; for example, Neo might
try to make a sound (do-voice) but be unable to be-
cause it has an object in its mouth.
Before Neo learns any scopes, its world is a \bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion" of changing token values in 26
streams. Scopes \chunk" streams into covarying pairs.
Without scopes, Neo has to learn uents by searching
for associated token values across all 26 streams. For ex-
ample, Neo has to consider associations between (sight-
color red) and, for instance, (sleep asleep), (hunger
full) and (voice screaming). With scopes, Neo can
limit its search for associations. Suppose Neo learns
the scope (sight-color sight-shape) but it learns no
other scopes relating sight-color to any other stream.
Then, it should look for associations between (sight-
color red) and tokens in the (sight-shape) stream,
but it needn't look for associations in any other streams.
Empirically, scopes make an enormous dierence in
the number and quality of the associations Neo learns.
Without scopes, Neo learns many thousands of mean-
ingless associations between token values; with them,
Neo learns a few hundreds of associations that corre-
spond to objects and activities in its environment.
Base Fluents
Whereas scopes represent the tendency of streams to
change state simultaneously, Neo's smallest uents,
called base uents, represent cooccurring tokens within
scopes. Suppose stream 
i
contains a at time t  1 and
b at time t. Then we say token a stops in stream i
at time t   1, denoted a(i,a,t-1), and token b starts in
stream i at time t, denoted `(i,b,t). Now suppose Neo
turns its head and its eyes alight on a red rattle. Neo
will detect two simultaneous events, `(sight-color,red,t)
and `(sight-shape,rattle-shape,t). Sometime later,
Neo might look somewhere else, which will gener-
ate two simultaneous stop events, a(sight-color,red,v)
and a(sight-shape, rattle-shape,v). Simultaneous start
events and stop events are evidence that a single
object|in this case a red rattle|or a single activity,
is making its presence felt in two streams. Of course,
two unrelated events could occur simultaneously in two
10 Best Scopes measure of 10 Worst Scopes measure of
association association
do-sleep sleep 1.0 sleep arm-x-angle  0
sight-color sight-shape .596 arm-x-angle arm-y-angle  0
sound voice .533 do-sleep arm-x-angle  0
arm arm-speed .453 do-sleep eat  0
do-mouth mouth .326 sleep eat  0
do-voice voice .325 tactile-skin tiredness  0
tactile-mouth mouth .315 do-arm hunger  0
sound do-voice .276 do-sleep arm-y-angle  0
tactile-mouth do-mouth .274 sleep arm-y-angle  0
do-head head .254 tactile-mouth hunger  0
Table 1: The ten best and ten worst scopes learned by Neo in 30,000 timesteps.
streams, but this sort of coincidence is less likely than
the coincidence of related events.
Neo looks for associations between start and stop
events within scopes. For example, having the scope
(sight-color sight-shape), Neo can try to associate
red and rattle-shape. But if Neo lacks a scope for,
say, sight-color and arm-speed, then it will never try
to associate red with fast. Thus scopes prevent Neo
from even considering many meaningless base uents.
Contingency tables count the cooccurrences of start
and stop events, and assess whether start and stop
events happen simultaneously signicantly often. For
example:
`(sight-color,
red,t)
`(sight-color,
red,t)
total
`(sight-shape,
rattle-shape,t)
65 27 92
`(sight-shape,
rattle-shape,t)
237 1931 2168
total 302 1958 2260
Of the 2260 times sight-color and sight-shape
changed together, rattle-shape became active 92
times, both rattle-shape and red became active 65
times, and red became active but rattle-shape didn't
237 times. The conditional probability of rattle-shape
starting clearly depends on whether something red or
non-red started; these probabilities are 65=92 = :71
and 27=92 = :29, respectively. Conversely, the condi-
tional probability of something red starting depends on
whether something rattle-shaped started. In short, red
and rattle-shape are associated. The strength of their
association can be measured many ways; one was de-
scribed in the previous section. Here, we use a modied
G statistic. Because G is sensitive to sample size, all
contingency tables are rst scaled to maintain their pro-
portions but have their totals equal 100. To scale the
table above, each cell value and marginal total would be
divided by 226. Then the G statistic is calculated for
the scaled table in the usual way.
Neo accepts a base uent when its contingency ta-
ble is signicant, as measured by the G statistic. Ac-
tually, the table above tells us only that red and
rattle-shape often start simultaneously, we also need
to establish that they often end simultaneously. For
this, Neo maintains another table like the previous
one for the events a(sight-shape,rattle-shape,t),a(sight-
color,red,t), and their complements. When Neo has ev-
idence that red and rattle-shape both start and stop
together in their respective streams, and do so more
often than would be expected by chance if they were in-
dependent, then it forms the base uent ((sight-shape
rattle-shape)(sight-color red)).
To summarize the story to this point, Neo learns
scopes, or pairs of streams that often change together.
As soon as it has learned a scope, Neo can use it to
learn base uents, which are scopes instantiated with
particular token values, such as ((sight-shape rattle-
shape)(sight-color red)). And as soon as Neo has
learned some base uents, it starts combining them into
larger structures called composite uents.
Composite Fluents
Whereas base uents represent associations between
cooccurring token values in streams, composite uents
represent cooccurring uents. Neo currently forms two
kinds of composite uents. Conjunctive uents are gen-
erated when uents F
1
and F
2
start together signi-
cantly often, and they also end together signicantly
often. Clearly, conjunctive uents are like base uents.
However, base uents combine token values into uents,
whereas conjunctive uents combine other uents; and
conjunctive uents are not constrained by scopes. Con-
tingency tables, like those described earlier, tabulate
the frequencies of the joint events (` F
1
& ` F
2
),
(` F
1
& ` F
2
), (` F
1
& ` F
2
) and (` F
1
& ` F
2
). The
modied G statistic, described above, tells Neo whether
the association between F
1
and F
2
is signicant. If so,
Neo forms the uent (AND F
1
F
2
).
The second kind of composite uent is formed when
one uent starts in the context of another one. Sup-
pose Neo is holding a rattle, and then it starts to chew
on the rattle (called \mouthing"). While it is hold-
ing the rattle, the uent ((tactile-hand wood)(hand
close)) is active, and when it starts mouthing, the u-
ent ((tactile-mouthwood)(do-mouthmouth))will
become active. The latter uent starts in the context of
the former. If this happens signicantly often then Neo
will form the context uent
(CONTEXT ((tactile-hand wood)(hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))
The contingency tables for context uents are up-
dated in a slightly dierent way from previous tables.
When uent F
2
starts at time t + i, Neo checks to see
whether uent F
1
is active, and if so, it updates the
rst cell of the contingency table, (` F
1
; t & ` F
2
; t+ i).
If F
2
starts and F
1
isn't active, then Neo updates the
third cell of the table, (` F
1
; t & ` F
2
; t + i). If F
1
is
active but F
2
doesn't start within a window of i time
steps, then Neo increments the second cell of the table,
(` F
1
; t & ` F
2
; t+ i). The modied G statistic tells
Neo whether F
2
starts in the context of F
1
more often
than would be expected by chance if F
1
and F
2
were
independent.
Chains
Context uents can be chained together to form multi-
uent sequences. Consider the previous context uent
and the following one:
(CONTEXT ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))
These uents share a common uent, ((tactile-hand
wood) (hand close)), so they may be composed into
a chain:
(CHAIN ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))
In words, Neo had nothing in its mouth and was crying,
then it grabbed something wooden, then it started to
mouth something wooden. Now consider another, very
similar, chain:
(CHAIN ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand plastic) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic)(do-mouth mouth)))
The only dierence between these chains is the ob-
ject that Neo grabs and mouths: in the rst case it is
wooden, in the second, plastic. We may form a class of
things that Neo can grab and mouth. The chains don't
say exactly which objects are in the class, but we know
they are either wood or plastic, and they are graspable,
and mouthable.
3
3
In general, we don't know that the object being grabbed
is identical with the object being mouthed, but the Neo sim-
Classes
Note that \graspable" and \mouthable" are interac-
tional properties (Lako 1984) that characterize Neo's
activities in its environment. Unlike \texture"|wood
or plastic|they are fundamentally subjective. What's
graspable by one agent isn't necessarily graspable by an-
other. Whereas texture is an inherent property of an ob-
ject, graspable is a property of the object and the agent
who may try to grasp it. Objective features such as tex-
ture have gotten a bad name because they appear inad-
equate for conceptual activities such as forming classes
and judging similarity; for instance, it is dicult, per-
haps impossible, to dene a category in terms of neces-
sary and sucient objective features. One is tempted
by the conjecture that categories might be dened in
terms of necessary and sucient interactional features,
instead. However, we will try to show that categories
are best dened in terms of activities, and the appar-
ent superiority of interactional features is due to them
describing activities better than objective features.
Consider a conceptual activity such as judging
whether a cup and a ladle are similar or dierent. We
immediately want to ask, \Similar or dierent in what
context?" As devices for transferring liquid, cups and
ladles are similar; as containers to drink from, they re-
quire dierent motor schemas; as something to serve
coee in at an elegant dinner, they aren't similar. Note
that the required context in which we judge similarity
is often an activity, often purposeful, and often agent-
centered. What's central to judging the similarity of ob-
jects is knowing which activities the objects are involved
in. Activities seem to selectwhich features of objects are
relevant to judgments of similarity; these features will
sometimes be objective, often interactional.
Why would Neo even want to have concepts, in par-
ticular classes? In a nutshell, because they capture the
structure of Neo's environment. Classes enable Neo to
make predictions about never before seen situations. If
Neo had formed the class of \rattle", and was given
a new rattle that resembled its old ones in some way,
it could immediately infer that this new object can be
grasped, held, and may even make a noise when shaken.
All the entailments of \rattle," all the things a rattle
can be used for and how it is expected to behave, are
immediately transferable to this new object. One can
also imagine that once a class has been established, a
symbol could be fairly easily attached to it. This sym-
bol makes it possible for an agent to communicate its
experience succinctly, with just one \word". It can also
reason about its experiences, for example during plan-
ning, at a level higher and more easily manageable than
the raw sensory data.
Neo's activities are not purposeful because Neo has
ulator is simple enough that this general problem doesn't
arise. It will, eventually.
no goals, but even so, Neo's activities|represented as
chains|are a basis for judging similarity and forming
some classes. In fact, although Neo learns chains, we
are responsible for using these chains to identify features
and form classes. This is how we do it: We match up
chains that have the same stream names in the same
order, creating an abstract chain, then form classes of
the token values. Consider these chains:
(CHAIN ((do-arm resting) (arm resting))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm resting) (arm resting))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic) (mouth mouthing)))
Looking only at stream names (e.g., do-arm, arm, do-
hand, ...) we see that all these chains are instances
of this abstract chain: (do-arm arm) ! (do-hand
hand)! (tactile-mouthmouth). What we're seeing
in the four chains, above, is two activities:
resting arm!
closing hand !
mouthing something
right-moving arm !
closing hand !
mouthing something
and the \something" in each activity is either wood or
plastic. It may not be immediately apparent how these
activities identify classes of objects, but in fact the ob-
jects that can participate in these activities are just
those objects that can be grasped, mouthed, and are
either wood or plastic. We know, because we built the
Neo simulator, that these objects include Neo's rattles
and bottles, but not the mobile, Mommy, or Neo's own
hand. (Incidentally, if Neo had run longer, it might
have learned that its keys can also participate in the
abstract chain, above, in which case the instantiated
chains would have included a uent ((tactile-mouth
metallic)(mouth mouthing)).) The point is that
the class of objects that can participate in an activity
is identied by interactional and objective features|
graspable, mouthable, wooden, plastic or metallic.
Although Neo is currently not capable of it, we can
imagine showing Neo a novel object, say, a small wooden
block, that Neo would classify with its rattles, bottles
and keys on the basis of being graspable and mouthable,
and wooden, plastic or metallic. Similarly, if we show
Neo a graspable but immovable wooden object, Neo
might put it in the same class as its crib bars. Again,
this classication would be made on the basis of activi-
ties. When Neo interacts with the new object it would
form a chain that includes ((do-hand close) (hand
close)) ((do-arm move-rt)(arm not-move))|after
grasping, Neo tries to move its arm but it cannot. As-
suming that Neo has learned a similar chain in its in-
teractions with the crib bars, it will be able to form
the class of objects that can be grasped but cannot be
moved.
What Neo can do is less spectacular, but promis-
ing. One of the most interesting abstract chains is only
two uents long: ((do-head head) ! (sight-shape
sight-color)). This chain identies many of the physi-
cal objects in Neo's environment. For example,
(CHAIN ((do-head lookup)(head lookup))
((sight-shape mobile-like)
(sight-color green)))
This chain says, when Neo directs its head to look up,
and actually looks up, then it will see the green mobile.
Here are two more examples:
(CHAIN
((do-head look+90)(look +90))
((sight-shape crib-like)(sight-color white)))
(CHAIN
((do-head look-90)(look -90))
((sight-shape crib-like)(sight-color white)))
In words, when Neo looks either to its extreme left (+90)
or extreme right (-90) it sees its crib.
Remarkably, uents that represent the color and
shape of objects do not appear in any other chains
learned by Neo; in other words, the ((do-head head)
! (sight-shape sight-color)) chain represents an ac-
tivity that denes the class of objects based on their
appearance after a head turn.
Classes of actions can be learned in the same way. For
example, here are four chains that Neo learned quickly
and observed frequently:
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-up) (arm move-up))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-dn) (arm move-dn))
((arm-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-lf) (arm move-lf))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
The abstract chain is (do-arm arm) ! (sight-
movement arm-speed), and it denes a class of ac-
tions in which, in the context of an arm movement, Neo
sees the arm moving fast.
Physical Schemas
We have seen how uents can be used to dene activ-
ities (by abstracting regularities in streams over time),
and how a set of related uents can be used to implic-
itly dene a category such as \graspable object." This
type of conceptual knowledge is still relatively specic
to Neo's capabilities and the particulars of Neo's envi-
ronment. What if it were possible to abstract an even
more general kind of uent that represents activities or
classes across domains? We call such data structures
physical schemas, and postulate that they are central
to the development of a cognitive agent. Their uses
include providing a basis for communication between
agents (by establishing a common frame of reference),
forming the building blocks for further abstract cate-
gories, and bridging the gap between an agent's senso-
rimotor behavior and its higher level cognitive skills.
Conisder as an example for a physical schema the no-
tion of \containment". It looks deceptively simple, but
actually covers a great number of situations, at varying
levels of abstraction. In terms of an agent's activities,
there is a dierence between containing a block in a box
(which will generally stay there if left alone) and con-
taining a ock of sheep within an unfenced eld, which
requires constant intervention by the agent. Dierent
contexts will require dierent containers: A cage will
contain an animal, but not a liquid. There are even
such concepts as containing a thought within one's head,
which doesn't even involve a palpable object. Lako and
Johnson have proposed that abstract concepts are un-
derstood by metaphorical extension from basic schemas
such as this one. You understand what it means to con-
tain a thought within your head by relating it to the
process of containing something within your hand, for
example. In this view, people communicate and reason
using such metaphors, which are derived from the physi-
cal structures of our bodies and the way we interactwith
the world. By giving us the ability to redescribe our
world in more familiar terms, they make understanding
it possible.
Could a concept like containment be represented with
uents? We believe so, although a great deal of work
clearly remains to be done. The key is noticing that
once again, physical schemas like all other concepts are
dened via an agent's activities. Containing something
could be thought of as being able to push it back into a
specied state should it move out of that state. If Neo
had simple uents for \moving" and \pushing" (simple
since they correspond to basic eector actions, and are
easily described physically), it should be able to learn
that when it can successfully and repeatedly keep an
object within a state by pushing it (applying force to
it), it has \contained" that object.
Like containment, all physical schemas share the
property of being domain general, grounded in physi-
cal activities and physical relationships such as \move,"
\push," and \in," while providing a very abstract con-
cept. Further examples are \support", \control", and
\cause". The total number of such schemas may not be
very large. It is our hypothesis that these concepts are
so generally useful that they will emerge in any intelli-
gent agent placed in any reasonable domain.
What Neo Knew and What It Learned
It is sometimes argued that real babies are born with
\faculties" for physical and spatial reasoning (Carey &
Spelke 1994), language (Pinker 1995), even reasoning
about living things (Keil 1994). Nobody believes that
much can be learned without constraints from percep-
tual systems, eectors, and prior mental structures, so
the question is not \whether" but \how much." Al-
though we eventually expect to show that Neo can ac-
quire a rich conceptual structure from minimal begin-
nings, at present, we can show no such thing, because
Neo's conceptual structure is quite poor|Neo learned
hundreds of uents and chains but these produced very
few classes of objects and activities|and Neo's prior
structure is not insignicant. Let us review what Neo
was born knowing:
Streams and Tokens. Neo experiences its world
through streams, and streams contain tokens such as
red and hungry.
A Notion of Events. Neo's learning methods all fo-
cus on start (`) and stop (a) events. Static streams or
uents don't interest Neo's learning methods.
Methods to Learn Scopes and Base Fluents. Neo
is born with a method to nd correlations among start
and stop events in streams. The resulting structures,
called scopes, constrain the simplest uents Neo learns.
Base uents are statistically signicant instantiations of
scopes with tokens. Neo is born with a method, based
on contingency tables, for learning base uents.
Methods to Learn Composite Fluents. The
method for learning conjunctive uents (and base u-
ents) is based on the idea that simultaneity is rare, so
when it is observed, it probably has a single cause. The
method for learning context uents and chains is based
on the idea that events sometimes follow others more of-
ten than expected by chance if they were unrelated, so
when this is observed, the events are probably causally
related. The learningmethods for base, conjunctive and
context uents all rely on contingency table analysis,
but the tables are set up slightly dierently.
Now consider what Neo learned:
 It learned that most of the regularity in its environ-
ment takes place in 30 pairs of streams, less than 10%
of the (2625)=2 = 325 pairs of streams that it might
have focused on.
 It learned base uents corresponding to the shape and
color of every object in its environment.
 It learned the permanent locations of the green mo-
bile (directly overhead) and the crib bars (to the ex-
treme left and right of its eld of view). No other
objects have permanent location, because Neo can
move them, but interestingly, it learned locations for
objects that it let sit for a long time.
 It learned activities, such as grasping an object and
mouthing it, or moving its arm and seeing its arm
move.
 It almost learned conditions. For example, it
learned a chain that includes ...((do-hand open)
(hand open)) ((tactile-mouth skin) (mouth
mouthing)), but it has no way to learn that the
rst uent is a condition for the second|that the
hand must be open to be mouthed.
 It learned chains from which we, the authors, ab-
stracted classes that make sense in Neo's environ-
ment, such as the class of objects that can be grasped
and mouthed, and the class of activities that end in
seeing the arm moving fast.
Keep in mind that Neo's actions are largely random:
when it grabs an object it can mouth it, but it's just as
likely to drop it, or move its head. Using the conceptual
structure learned to guide further knowledge acquisition
is the next step in our research program. The only struc-
ture in Neo's actions is provided by conditions (e.g., it
cannot mouth an object it hasn't grasped, and it can-
not mouth its hand unless the hand is open) and by
a handful of simple behavioral dependencies built into
the simulator (e.g., it sometimes grabs what it looks at,
and it cries if it gets hungry). Keeping in mind also that
Neo ran for only 30,000 time steps, it seems to us that
it learned quite a lot.
Related Work
Attempts to build complete cognitive systems such as
the one we are proposing have been rare; some exam-
ples follow. Andreae viewed his PURR-PUSS sys-
tem as a general approach to building an intelligent
agent (Andreae 1977). It resembles Neo in that it is
based on few general design principles, primarily trying
to predict its future sensory experiences and exploring
those aspects of its environment that it cannot fully ex-
plain. Unfortunately, though, PURR-PUSS was lim-
ited by its somewhat rigid approach and the lack of
available computing power at the time. Soar (Laird,
Newell, & Rosenbloom 1987) is also viewed by its de-
signers as an architecture for intelligence and a theory
of cognition. However, Soar requires a lot of built-
in structure, e.g. production rules and ultimate goal
states, and places no value on learning through interac-
tion. The learning it does, called chunking , is limited
to storing problem solving experiences for future use.
Neo, on the other hand, attempts to build structures
that will help it explain its environment. Brooks' Cog
project has a lot in common with Neo, both in motiva-
tion and general design principles (Brooks & Stein 1993;
Brooks 1996). He views cooccurrence of events as key to
learning, and emphasizes the importanceof embodiment
for the emergence of human-like behavior and concep-
tual knowledge. We dier fromBrooks, however, in that
we do not feel that a physical embodiment|as opposed
to simulation|is absolutely necessary.
The principle of interactivity in learning has been
nding growing support in recent years even in AI circles
(e.g. (Kuipers & Byun 1991; Mataric 1992)). Drescher
has taken Piaget's principles of elaboration and accom-
modation to heart (Drescher 1991). His system elabo-
rates \context{action{result" triples into schemas that
resemble the uent representationwe use, although they
are somewhat less general and not as directly grounded
in sensory experience. The agent forms new concepts by
creating \synthetic items" to denote unknown aspects
of the world that are responsible for some regularity in
the observed schemata.
There is a vast amount of work in the eld of Arti-
cial Life describing aspects of animal behavior and an-
imal interaction within societies. Into this broad area
falls Bates' work on articial characters (Bates 1992;
Reilly & Bates 1992). There are even some very realis-
tic and fairly completemodels of individual animals, e.g.
shes (Terzopoulos, Tu, & Grzeszczuk 1994). We do not
place too much emphasis on modeling animal or human
behavior, however. Instead, we are trying to develop a
general mechanism for the acquisition of abstract con-
ceptual knowledge, and show how such knowledgemight
be useful to the agent.
Conclusion
The goal of the Neo project is to build a virtual in-
fant that learns many of the cognitive skills that we
expect from a three-year old. Underlying these skills is
a conceptual structure, an ontology, a way to \carve the
world at its joints." This conceptual structure identies
classes, and supports judgments of similarity. Follow-
ing Lako, Johnson, Mandler and others, our position
is that concepts are based in activities. Neo's uents
represent objects, states, dependencies and activities.
We believe that they can be extended to learn very ab-
stract and general \physical schemas". We were able to
identify classes by examining Neo's learned activities,
thus providing the rst evidence from this project that
conceptual structure can be learned by interacting with
the environment.
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